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resolve banking cries  We characterize the birthing process of banking in transition and 
the three essential features of banking crises in transition economies: (i) bad loans and the 
relationship to state owned industries, (ii) development of institutional infrastructure and 
(iii) credible commitments to resolution and privatization.  We then discuss the  
experiences of seven important transition countries in order to identify the salient features 
of their efforts to resolve banking crises.   
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 The resolution of bank crises in the transition economies, at least until the late 
1990s, differs from resolution elsewhere.  Transition banking experienced a birthing 
stage in which a decentralized private banking system was carved out of the vestiges of a 
public monobank structure.   The banks carved out of the state monobank were often 
undercapitalized and, most importantly, were expected to support the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in the evolving market economy.  Furthermore, the state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) were often joined by poorly capitalized and loosely regulated 
new entrants.  In essence, the birthing process provided the seeds of banking crisis.  
However, calling transition banking a special case begs the issue of understanding how 
these countries corrected the situation relatively quickly.  Although the transition 
experiences in dealing with financial fragility were often costly and sometimes drawn out 
by a slow learning process, most countries in the region now have remarkably strong 
banking systems.   
 
 In this paper, we examine the experiences of transition economies with financial 
fragility.  In the first section, we characterize the birthing process and the three essential 
features of banking crises in transition economies.  In the next section, we examine the 
experiences of seven important transition countries in order to identify the salient features 
of their efforts to resolve banking crises.  Our reflections on these experiences are found 
in a concluding section.   
 
Banking in transition countries: the birthing process 
 
Banking sectors in transition economies (TEs) underwent a birthing stage in 
which a decentralized private banking system was carved out of the vestiges of a public 
monobank structure. In some TEs, a single new bank assumed the entire commercial 
portfolio of the monobank; in others, several new commercial banks were born.  In 
addition, one or more large specialty banks existed having monopolies over their 
respective core activities, e.g., a savings bank for primary deposits and a foreign trade 
bank for all foreign currency transactions.  The resulting state-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBs) were undercapitalized and expected to support the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the evolving market economy. In addition, entry requirements were relatively 
lax to induce domestic competition so that poorly capitalized and loosely regulated 
private entrants added to the seeds of banking crises.   
 
 Governments in the TEs faced three interrelated major tasks in developing 
efficient banking sectors from this embryo. First, most of the SOCBs were insolvent.  
Prior to transition, loans were not made according to market criteria so that many of the 
existing assets held by these banks became non-performing in the market economy.  In 
addition, the situation was exacerbated at the outset of transition by governments that 
were eager to eliminate fiscal deficits. They eliminated fiscal subsidies to SOEs, which 
turned to their SOCBs for financial support.  Therefore, the first task for developing 
independent banking sectors was to correct the incentives that generated bad lending and 
to make transparent the financing of government policies.   
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 Bank insolvency has two components, namely the stock of inherited bad loans 
and the flow of new bad loans.  To prevent the recurrence of insolvency, any resolution 
program must remove from the banks both the incentives to make bad loans and the 
impediments that prevent them from extricating themselves from weak clients.  To the 
extent that SOCBs are unable to shed SOEs that cannot perform profitably in the market 
environment, providing financial support for these clients insures that bad loans will 
continue to impact adversely the solvency of SOCBs.   
 
 The second task, creating the institutional and legislative infrastructure to support 
and facilitate the transition to a market economy, was of equal importance.  Without the 
supporting institutional and legislative infrastructure, neither the information nor the 
incentives for resolving bank insolvencies are forthcoming.  Therefore, institution 
building is necessary although it is not sufficient.  Specifically, bankruptcy laws and 
accounting standards were required to change the behavior of economic agents who were 
accustomed to operating in the non-market environment and human capital development 
was needed to for effective implementation.  Proper attention must be given to the 
incentives of individual decision makers if the legislation is to be implemented 
successfully. Hence, any resolution program must be integrated carefully with the 
evolving institutional structure to avoid inconsistencies and unwarranted expectations.  
Since the SOCBs held the predominant share of banking assets, the third task was  bank 
privatization.   
 
To avoid a moral hazard problem, the government must be able to commit 
credibly to a final resolution of the insolvency problem.  Multiple recapitalizations of 
SOCBs in the TEs were taken as evidence of an inability or unwillingness on the part of 
governments to harden budget constraints on banks and, by association, their client 
SOEs.  In retrospect, a combination of the difficulties of recognizing the full extent of the 
problem due to the dynamics and a reluctance to allow banks to sever relationships with 
existing weak clients influenced significantly the policy options. 
 
The EBRD identifies 27 TEs (not counting China and the other Asian TEs) 
although the group is probably no more alike than any random sampling of nations 
around the world.  Included are large countries, e.g. Russia, and extremely small 
countries, e.g. Slovenia and Estonia. Considerable differences in the level of development 
are observed from Central Europe to Central Asia leading to significant differences in 
banking systems.  In order to provide an overview of the salient issues, we focus on seven 
TEs that have different characteristics and progress in bank restructuring.  We include the 
two largest TEs, namely, Russia and China, and we consider the TEs with the most 
developed banking systems, both at the start of transition and at the present, namely, 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In addition, we consider two other TEs with a 
long history of grappling with banking development, namely, Bulgaria and Romania.  
Our choices do not include very small countries, those with idiosyncratic political 
situations (e.g. former Yugoslavia) or those with minimal extent of financial 
intermediation (e.g. some CIS republics).   
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 A stable macroeconomic environment is a necessary condition for effective 
financial intermediation.  Macroeconomic stabilization occurs when the transition shock 
to output comes to an end and the inflation rate stabilizes below hyperinflation levels. 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 show annual real GDP growth rates and inflation rates 
respectively for the seven countries in the seven countries discussed.  Using positive real 
growth and an inflation rate of 50% as thresholds, we date macroeconomic stabilization 
as follows: Poland, 1992; Czech Republic, 1993; Hungary, 1994; Russia, 1997;1 
Bulgaria, 1998; and Romania, 2000.  The birthing process for the banking system 
continued beyond the point of stabilization in the earliest stabilizers, i.e., Poland and, 
particularly, the Czech Republic.  In the other countries, bank restructuring corresponded 
fairly closely with the date of macroeconomic stabilization.  We will see in country 
discussions that there is a joint causality between bank restructuring and macroeconomic 
stabilization.  Each makes the other possible. An interesting exception is China that 
experiences neither negative growth nor high inflation throughout the period and, 
interestingly, has just begun to restructure its banks.
 
The impact of a banking crisis or of a slow birthing process depends on the depth 
of financial intermediation in these countries.  A banking crisis has less impact on an 
economy based on cash transactions than on one with extensive use of bank deposits.2  
As long as the government has a mechanism in place for the distribution of currency, 
bank insolvencies have no systemic effect.3  Appendix Tables 3 and 4 provides annual 
data for two measures of financial depth, the ratio of M2 to GDP and the ratio of 
domestic credit to provided by the banking sector to GDP.  Hyperinflation at the start of  
transition often reduced the extent of intermediation, particularly in Bulgaria and 
Romania.  Although these countries, and Russia as well, had very costly banking crises, 
they were able to start a macroeconomic recovery quickly.  The Czech Republic and 
Hungary had deeper financial systems in the 1990s and therefore larger macroeconomic 
consequences of banking crises.  Finally, China has a comparatively deep financial 
system and therefore may be vulnerable to the effects of any banking crisis that might 
occur.  Since banking crises and macroeconomic contractions are occur simultaneously, 
we do not provide specific estimates of the macro consequences of each crisis.  However, 
efforts to restructure the banking system can be estimated.   
 
For estimates of the costs of bank restructuring programs, we draw on those found 
in Caprio and Klingbiel (2003), Tang et al. (2000) and Zoli (2001).   Bonin and Wachtel 
(2003) summarize banking developments in transition and Enoch et al. (2002) addresses 
the issue of resolution. 
 
Resolving bank crises in transition countries 
 
Poland.  A two-tier structure was established in 1989 resulting in a central bank, 
nine regionally based  SOCBs and four specialty banks.  In 1991, the Polish government 
recapitalized banks to cover losses from the currency devaluation.  By 1993, non-
performing loans were still 31% of total bank loans as banks continued to lend to their 
non-restructured SOE clients. With the support of the World Bank, the Polish 
government designed a bank-led, enterprise restructuring plan that linked bank 
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privatization and recapitalization with bad-debt workouts.  In addition, the agricultural 
bank BGZ, which is an umbrella for numerous agricultural cooperative banks, was 
recapitalized.  The government also made efforts to restructure the industry by 
orchestrating mergers through a bank consolidation program.  Caprio and Klingbiel 
(2003) indicate that the cost of recapitalizing the seven commercial banks in 1993 was 
$750 million and the cost of recapitalizing the agricultural banks was $900 million. Zoli 
(2001) estimates the total fiscal cost of all restructuring efforts in Poland at only 7.4% of 
GDP, most of which was due to initial recapitalizations in 1991.4    
 
 Throughout this period, the payments system functioned with a few notable early 
problems due to the underdeveloped infrastructure for clearing checks among the 
regional banks.  In addition, financial depth did not decline and foreign participation, 
both greenfield and in the privatization process, began after 1995. The legal 
infrastructure, which was largely the pre-Communist commercial code because extensive 
legal reforms did not occur until the later 1990s, was adequate for the early development 
of the banking sector.  The central bank operated at arms length from bank restructuring 
and played an effective supervisory role.  By 1998, a majority of the banking system was 
private and, by the end of the following year, more than half of bank equity was foreign 
owned.   
 
 The fundamental characteristic of the Polish approach to bank restructuring is that 
the responsibility for working out bad loans was retained by the banks, which were 
expected to promote enterprise restructuring.  The program was intended to build 
institutional capability in the banks and provide flexible enterprise restructuring without 
government interference.  The underlying presumptions were that the major bank creditor 
had sufficient information about their large SOE clients either to promote restructuring or 
to opt for liquidation and that the banks had sufficient incentives to maximize debt 
collections.  Actual experiences indicate that restructuring dominated bankruptcy and that 
the main workout instrument used by the weaker banks was the debt-equity swap.  Bonin 
and Leven (2001) find that new credit extended to three large military-industrial clients 
by one SOCB in the program exceeded the total amount of the bank’s recapitalization and 
left it with more, rather than less, exposure to these clients.  Hence, Poland’s program 
strengthened, rather than severed the ties between banks and their undesirable clients and 
provided breathing room for weak SOEs to postpone painful restructuring.  
 
Hungary.  The birthing process in Hungary started with the establishment of the 
SOCBs in 1987 and a regulatory agency in 1992.  Although the initial steps were 
appropriate, two sources of difficulty emerged.  First, lax entry standards resulted in the 
creation of many small and poorly capitalized or poorly run de novo banks that were 
responsible for several instances of fraud.  Many of the de novo banks became insolvent 
and were either closed or forced to merge with other institutions.  Although this 
experience threatened the stability of the financial system, no systemic crisis or explicit 
bailouts by the government or the central bank occurred.  Second, the establishment of 
the SOCBs did little to change the relationship between banks and their traditional SOE 
customers, particularly because the banks were organized along sectoral lines. Bad loans 
by SOCBs to SOEs accumulated rapidly.  Moreover, improvements in accounting rules 
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for classifying loans and new bankruptcy legislation served to indicate that the bad loan 
problem was large and growing.5   
 
In an initial effort to recapitalize banks in 1991, the Hungarian government 
extended loan guarantees for inherited bad loans.  The government bought loans and 
interest claims that totaled almost 3% of GDP and paid for them with specially issued 
bonds.  About one-third of the loans were transferred to a factoring agency for workout 
and the rest was left with the banks to work out under contracts with the Ministry of 
Finance that restricted new lending. 
  
The Hungarian approach involved dealing with bank recapitalization, enterprise 
restructuring, and institutional development simultaneously.  During 1993, the 
government developed a program for the recapitalization of large (non-bank) SOEs.  The 
government bought or forgave debts of these enterprises and the banks received 
government bonds in excess of 1% of GDP as part of the program.  Nevertheless, the 
amount of bad or doubtful debt at the banks kept increasing and another comprehensive 
recapitalization followed at the end of 1993 when capital injections of more than $1 
billion were made. The recipients included the three large SOCBs, which accounted for 
over half of the overdue credit in the banking system and were insolvent.  Later stages of 
the program in 1994 provided additional financing and incentives to deal with bad loan 
problems. The total amount provided was somewhat less than 2% of GDP and the three 
large commercial banks received over 80% of the funds involved.  
 
 Multiple recapitalizations of its SOCBs earned Hungary the dubious reputation at 
the time as being the country most oblivious to moral hazard. The first recapitalization 
was insufficient both because the instruments used were not sufficiently liquid or 
financially attractive and because the banks were still servicing bad clients. The second 
bank recapitalization was ultimately successful because soon afterwards Hungary 
adopted a policy of privatizing state banks by selling controlling shares to strategic 
foreign investors. The willingness of the Hungarian government to sell large banks to 
strategic foreign owners provided the credible commitment of no further bank bailouts 
and hastened reforms in the relationships between banks and SOEs.  Between mid-1994 
and 1997, all of the Hungarian state owned banks were sold to foreign investors.  
 
The Hungarian experience points to the importance of SOCBs achieving 
independence both from the state and from undesirable clients. By the end of the 1990s, 
the Hungarian banking sector was the strongest in the region. The costs of the 
recapitalization programs in the 1990s amounted to 13% of 1998 GDP (Tang, et. al.).   
 
Although the Hungarian banking sector is largely well capitalized and controlled 
by foreigners, it has not been immune to banking crises. A few small banks have been 
liquidated without any direct cost to the government because the deposit insurance 
agency covered the deposits.  In 1997, a run on the sixth largest bank resulted in its 
nationalization and the subsequent dismissal of the bank’s management for fraudulent 
behavior.   It continued to accumulated losses and cost the government 1.7% of GDP (not 
included in the above total costs).  The bank was privatized in 2003 for about 2.75 times 
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its book value illustrating the resiliency of the mature Hungarian banking system to 
resolve successfully a banking crisis and avoid systemic problems.  
 
Czech Republic.  Working capital of SOEs in Czechoslovakia was funded by 
short-term, low-interest, revolving bank credit (TOZ loans).  All of these loans were 
transferred to a hospital bank and the large SOCBs were freed of bad loans accumulated 
before 1991.  This restructuring program cost about $750 million or less than 1% of 
GDP.  About one third of the funds went to capital infusions to the large banks and the 
rest was related to the takeover of bad loans.  However, the SOE clients remained with 
their parent banks that continued to provide banking services and new loans.  To 
encourage competition, privatization, and expansion, all banks were given refinancing 
credits by the central bank.   
 
 Three of the largest four banks in the Czech Republic participated in the first wave 
of voucher privatization in 1992.  Investment funds, the largest of which were created by 
these banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher privatization program.  Hence, this 
initial divestiture of state holdings in banks and companies resulted in an interlocking 
ownership of banks and clients in which the state retained large controlling stakes of the 
privatized banks. The banks maintained their long-standing soft-lending relationships with 
their voucher-privatized enterprise clients and through the bank-owned privatization 
funds now held an equity interest in these firms.  Voucher privatization strengthened the 
relationships between banks and their clients and contributed to rapid deterioration of the 
banks’ balance sheets.   In addition, the existence of the state-owned hospital bank made 
it impossible for the government to commit credibly to end further bank bailouts.  
Moreover, tax laws that restricted write offs and laws that restricted the ability of banks 
to sell collateral contributed to the growth of bad loans.  Although the situation was 
quickly apparent, several years passed before any meaningful efforts were made to 
resolve the problems. 
 
 In the interim, many small and medium-sized banks encountered liquidity 
problems, which led to additional resolution programs (Matousek and Taci, 2002). At the 
end of 1995, a second consolidation program involved closures, liquidations, and mergers 
of many small and medium-sized banks with the central bank acting as lender of last 
resort to keep open some of the banks in receivership.  Although the 18 banks in this 
program represented only 9% of bank assets, fear that a systemic bank crisis provided the 
rationale for the government’s policy.  The program cost to the central bank was 2% of 
1996 GDP.  
 
 In the summer of 1996, a run on Agrobanka, the fifth largest bank at the time, 
resulted in liquidity support of over $500 million.  The government provided liquidity by 
buying bad assets at face value if the bank agreed to improvements in management, 
developed a workout plan, reduced risky activity such as securities trading, and obtained 
infusions of capital from the owners.  An additional $500 million was committed to the 
program.   
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Finally, during 1996 and 1997, a stabilization program covering bad loans in the 
large banks was enacted to deal with solvency issues. As a consequence of the 
recapitalization programs, the government once again became the majority owner of the 
four large Czech banks.  Neither the creation of a separate hospital bank for bad loans nor 
several rounds of cleaning up the banks’ balance sheets had made the big four Czech 
banks strong financial institutions.  In 1997, the government belatedly adopted a strategy 
of selling the banks by auction to foreign strategic investors.  The first such sale was the 
purchase in 199 of Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB) by Nomura.  Nomura took no active 
role in reforming the bank choosing instead to tunnel value from the bank’s investment 
funds.  Large loan losses led to a run on deposits and IPB was taken over by the central 
bank. The central bank provided a guarantee against future loan losses and removed a 
further $2.5 billion of bad loans from IPB.   
  
Extensive banking system problems persisted throughout the 1990s in the Czech 
Republic, well after other Hungary and Poland had established mature banking systems.  
In 1999, 30.6% of all bank loans were non-performing (Caprio and Klingbiel, 1999).  The 
privatizations of the three large Czech banks were preceded by loan transfers to the 
hospital bank, which totaled more than 3% of GDP.  Privatization revenues provided 
some partial offset and in one case, the government provided guarantees against future 
losses from inherited loans as part of the privatization deal.   
 
Tang et. al. (2000)  calculates the present value of restructuring costs in 1998 as  
4.8% of 1998 GDP for the central bank, mainly from the second consolidation program in 
1997, and 20.6% of 1998 GDP for the government, mainly from the initial capital 
infusion in 1991 and the purchase of bad loans in the early 1990s.  However, the hospital 
bank, which is the principal asset management company in the Czech Republic, has a 
poor record of collecting debts, has borrowed from the central bank, and has government 
guarantees.  Any further losses incurred by the hospital bank could increase the costs of 
bank resolution in the Czech Republic, which is already far greater than the costs 
incurred in Hungary or Poland.  
 
Bulgaria.  At the start of transition there were a large number of state-owned 
banks in Bulgaria, both sectoral banks and regional commercial banks.  Following a 
voluntary merger of 22 of the former credit branches of the central bank to form United 
Bulgarian Bank (UBB), government-orchestrated restructuring began with the formation 
of the Bank Consolidation Company in 1993 (Bonin, 2004).   However, two impediments 
to banking sector developed persisted.  First, enterprise reform lagged and support for 
SOEs shifted from the budget to quasi-fiscal subsidies through the banking system.  
Second, banks routinely granted forex credits to enterprises without holding forex 
deposits and currency mismatch proved to be a serious problem for the solvency of the 
banking system.  In 1992, the government attempted to address the currency issue by 
providing banks with government bonds denominated in dollars (ZUNKs) in return for 
loans.  However, responsibility for loan recovery remained with the banks.   
 
The initial efforts at bank restructuring in Bulgaria were an expensive failure.  In 
1993 and 1994, the costs were 10.9% and 23.1% of GDP, respectively.6 Two of the 
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sectoral banks and UBB required injections of liquidity from the central bank in 1995 and 
most of the SOCBs were insolvent.   About half of all loans in SOCBs were non-
performing but the political will and the legal framework to close down banks was 
lacking.  Finally, in 1996, 19 banks accounting for almost one-third of banking assets 
were closed.  In February 1997, a currency crisis erupted as the lev depreciated 
significantly.  A currency board, established in July 1997 to deal with the macroeconomic 
crisis, prohibited central bank lending and provided the credible commitment to no 
further bank bailouts.  From 1996 to 1997, bank restructuring costs were shared by the 
government, through additional loan for bond swaps, and the central bank, through losses 
on unsecured credits.  Total costs amounted to 9.9% and 4.1% of GDP in 1996 and 1997, 
respectively.  
 
Over the decade, the total cost of bank restructuring in Bulgaria was 41.6% of 
GDP, far larger than the cost for any other TE.7  Bank restructuring failed in Bulgaria for 
two primary reasons.  First, the incentive structure for banks was not changed because 
bond swaps for bad loans did not stem new lending to the same unreformed SOE clients. 
Second, the institutional framework for improving the banking system did not exist.  
Prudential regulations and supervision were not in place until 1997, several years later 
than in the other ETEs, and international accounting standards were not applied until 
1998 (Tang, et al., 2000).  Neither the necessary institutional structure nor a credible 
commitment to abstain from further bailouts existed before the establishment of the 
currency board.  
 
Romania.  The birthing process in Romania resulted in one large commercial 
bank carved from the portfolio of the central bank, which joined four specialty banks.  
The balance sheets of these state owned banks were deteriorating from the start.  Efforts 
at macroeconomic stabilization worsened the conditions of some of the banks.  Exchange 
rate liberalization and the elimination of subsidized agricultural credits led to financial 
distress at the foreign trade bank, Bancorex, and Banca Agricola due to accumulating bad 
debts from directed credits to the energy and agricultural sectors, respectively.  The two 
banks raised interest rates in 1997 in order to attract deposits and stave off runs, which 
affected the ability of the central bank to conduct monetary policy.  Late in 1997, the 
government bailed out the two banks with $1 billion in bonds, almost 3% of GDP that 
were then refinanced by the central bank.   At the end of 1998, over 50% of all bank 
credit was rated in the loss category and even more in Bancorex.  Clearly, the solvency of 
the entire Romanian banking system was at stake.  
 
The anticipated restructuring of the large foreign trade bank, Bancorex, never 
took place although a new management team was put in place. The IMF estimates that 
subsequent mismanagement and delay in restructuring the Bancorex doubled the cost to 
the public of resolving the crisis. In February 1999, the government established a hospital 
bank to take over the bad debts from Bancorex and Banca Agricola.  Most of Bancorex’s 
loan portfolio was transferred to the agency for workout; initially this amounted to about 
$1.7 billion or 5% of GDP.  However, the bank’s problems were insurmountable and 
Bancorex collapsed in April 1999 after a run by depositors even while efforts to 
restructure it were ongoing.  Since further recapitalization would require a fiscal outlay in 
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excess of 5% of GDP, the government decided to close Bancorex and merge the healthy 
part of its portfolio with the large state-owned commercial bank.  In addition, about $2 
billion more in bad loans from Bancorex and Banka Agricola were transferred to the 
hospital bank. To avoid a systemic crisis, the central bank provided liquidity.  In addition, 
the government compensated the commercial bank for deposit withdrawals and any 
balance sheet gap resulting from its absorbing Bancorex.    
 
From the beginning of 1997 through the end of 2000, the assets of the Romanian 
banking sector shrunk by about 50% in real terms.  Improved organization of bank 
supervision did not occur until late in 1999.  Romania was both slow to achieve 
macroeconomic stabilization and slow to recognize bank insolvencies.  Although 
privatizations to foreign investors have begun, the banking system remains fragile.  
 
Russia.  The two-tier banking system began in Russia (then Soviet Union) in 1987 
with the separation of commercial bank functions from Gosbank8 and the creation of 
sectoral banks by enterprises or former branch ministries.  Sberbank, the state savings 
bank, held most household deposits, which were channeled directly through the state 
banks to enterprises.  New entry into Russian banking was dramatic; a few hundred banks 
were created in 1988 and 1989 and the number of new banks increased by about 1,000 in 
1990 and by another 1,000 shortly thereafter (Aslund, 1996). Most banks were small and 
poorly capitalized; some of them were merely house banks for enterprises although some 
later emerged as the largest commercial banks in Russia.  In addition, Russia’s banking 
system remained extremely thin throughout the 1990s; the extent of financial 
intermediation was low even by comparison with other TEs. 
 
 Although the Russian banking system was immature, the financial crisis of 1998 
exhibited many classical causes.  First, asset stripping and excessive risk taking by banks 
occurred in an environment with little supervision of banks, no uniform accounting 
standards, and a willingness of the central bank to provide liquidity to the banking 
system.  Second, balance sheet expansion involved both currency and maturity 
mismatches as the banks bought long-term, high-interest, ruble assets with short-term, 
and often low-interest dollar-denominated liabilities.  Although there was little effort at 
risk management, the banks remained solvent under Russian accounting standards and 
prudential regulations. Non-performing loans were reported to be only 19% of total loans 
in 1997, which was no higher than in the European TEs and less than in some of the 
Asian countries that experienced a banking crisis at the same time. However, because of 
the absence of effective regulation and a program for restructuring, much of the Russian 
banking system was in serious difficulty even prior to the government debt crisis of 1998.  
 
 The banking crisis only became apparent when the fiscal crisis caused the 
government to suspend payments on its debt, which resulted in the collapse of the ruble. 
Bank withdrawals led to an immediate shortage of liquidity. Small banks suffered due to 
their ties to the large banks and the withdrawal of central bank liquidity after the collapse 
of the Ruble. The central bank responded by allowing banks to draw on required reserve 
deposits for payments and by offering stabilization credits to banks. To forestall a bank 
run, banks were encouraged to shift 50% of their ruble deposits and 10% of their foreign 
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currency deposits to Sberbank, which was thought to enjoy full implicit deposit insurance 
because the central bank is its majority shareholder.  As the transfer of deposits to 
Sberbank continued, the quality of its balance sheet deteriorated because it was required 
to adopt international accounting standards (IMF, 2003) 
 
The full extent of the solvency problem in the banking system was realized in 
subsequent months, particularly as pressure from international financial institutions led to 
closer scrutiny of the banks. The Russian authorities agreed to conduct due diligence 
reviews using Western accounting standards for 18 of the largest banks accounting for 
about one-half of banking assets outside of state-controlled banks.  Legal reforms 
involving bankruptcy and banking laws to facilitate restructuring and rehabilitation of 
banks were begun and a commitment was made to strengthen the supervisory capacity of 
the central bank.  However, restrictions on foreign participation in banking remained in 
place. The number of banks operating in Russia decreased due to closures and 
consolidations.  More importantly, total credit and the real money supply contracted 
sharply.   The credit contraction did not have a larger effect on the economy because of 
the low level of financial intermediation at the time. 
 
 Progress at bank restructuring was slow because the authorities delayed taking 
actions under the new legislation which only came into effect in mid-1999 and which also 
encouraged delays.  An agency for restructuring problem banks, ARCO, was established 
but the rules invited procrastination.  A bank that fulfilled certain criteria as to size and 
the nature of their problems had to be referred to ARCO by the central bank.  ARCO 
decides whether to manage or liquidate the problem bank (Chekurova, 2001). The rules 
are full of contradictions, e.g. ARCO takes on the rights of shareholders at an annual 
meeting but it may only replace management for one month.   Furthermore, although 
ARCO was responsible for the restructuring program, only the central bank could 
withdraw a banking license. ARCO had few resources available so it appeared that the 
government intended to liquidate rather than restructure the large banks.  In addition, the 
interests of individual depositors were disregarded during liquidation as most of the 
money in the banks was removed shortly before the process began. Caprio and Klingbiel 
(2003) estimate that the cost of a full bailout of Russian banks was $15 billion or between 
5% and 7% of GDP. 
 
 Observers of Russian banking noted immediately the problems with the Russian 
approach to bank restructuring.  First, the limited resources available meant that 
potentially efficient banks were liquidated, probably by design (Thiesen, 2000).  Second, 
the potential contribution of foreign financial institutions was ignored (Buch and 
Heinrich, 1999).  Third, ARCO itself had little authority to change bank operations and 
incentives once a restructuring took place.   
 
 Although the post-1998 changes were a sharp departure from the wildcat 
approach to banking that had prevailed, no comprehensive plan for restructuring, no clear 
and prompt application of prudential rules, and no introduction of private (foreign) 
capital with the proper incentives were forthcoming (World Bank, 2002). Even if 
Western prudential standards had been applied to Russian banks prior to 1998, the fiscal 
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crisis would have precipitated a banking crisis because the banks were large holders of 
government debt.  Nonetheless, the government’s response was inadequate and its 
mismanagement added to the public perception of the fragility of Russian banks.   
 
The Russian experience provides the best illustration of the importance of having 
an adequate institutional framework in place. In Russia, the necessary legislation did not 
exist nor was the commitment to utilize the existing legal structure or the ability to apply 
existing law forthcoming.  In addition, the central bank did not act quickly to begin bank 
restructuring, even in situations in which it had the authority to do so. Although there are 
ample reasons to criticize the highly politicized and inconsistent approach to bank 
restructuring taken by the Russian authorities after the 1998 crisis, the banking system 
did rebound remarkably in the post-crisis years.   
    
China.   China has only recently begun to deal with the problem of non-
performing loans in its four large SOCBs, which account for more than two-thirds of both  
domestic credits to the non-financial sector and household deposits. Throughout the 
1980s and in the first half of the 1990s, bank loans to GDP increased from 50% to 120%.  
The Commercial Banking Law, promulgated in 1995, ostensibly made banks responsible 
for their profits and losses but it also contained language that required banks to conduct 
lending in accordance with the government’s industrial policy.  If the latter directive is in 
conflict with the former, SOCBs cannot be held fully responsible for lending decisions. 
By 1996, loss-making SOEs were predominant so that the consolidated financial position 
of the state sector was negative.  During this period, the government explicitly sought 
financial support from the SOCBs in the form of policy loans that accounted for more 
than one-third of total bank loans in the 1990s (Bonin and Huang, 2001). 
 
The Chinese government began to address the bad loan problem in 1994 by 
creating three banks to take over policy lending.  By 2000, the policy banks accounted for 
over 12% of bank loans in China.  In 1999, the Chinese government established four 
asset management companies (AMCs), one associated with each of the four large 
SOCBs, to deal with non-performing loans amounting initially to about 19% of the total 
loans on the books of SOCBs.  By attaching each AMC to a large SOCB, the Chinese 
government created an incentive problem. Even though a sunset provision has been 
imposed on the AMCs, a SOCB is likely to view its AMC as a bin into which bad loans 
can be discarded continuously.  Simultaneously, the government has been pursuing a 
program of restructuring and downsizing SOEs.  Hence, the clients of the SOCBs are 
becoming stronger financially. At the same time, the private sector is growing rapidly, 
providing banks with healthy potential clients.  Current Western estimates indicate that 
the totality of bad loans in banks and AMCs constitute about 40% of GDP.  To what 
extent China can grow out of this bad loan problem and to what extent the large SOCBs 
will require considerable recapitalization is an ongoing concern for the government. 
 
In many TEs, privatization of SOCBs to majority foreign owners established an 
arms-length regulatory relationship between the government and the banks and provided 
credibility to the no-bailout commitment. The four large Chinese banks will not be 
privatized in this way in the foreseeable future. In addition, Chinese banks are protected 
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from outside competition because the capital account remains closed and operations of 
foreign financial firms are limited, despite China’s recent entry into the WTO. Hence, 
considerable institution building and gradual divesting of government stakes in the 
SOCBs by sales in the stock market must be combined to impose the necessary financial 
discipline on China’s four large banks. The final cost of the eventual resolution of bank 
insolvencies in China is likely to be toward the upper range for the TEs and may be as 
large as 40% of GDP. 
   
Conclusion 
 The experiences with bank resolution in the transition countries are related to 
peculiar aspects of the transition and to idiosyncrasies of a particular country’s banking 
sector; nonetheless several overall lessons can be drawn. First, insolvency will continue 
to plague the banking system so long as the incentive structure that encourages banks to 
support weak SOEs is not changed. By its nature, banking is a relational business and bad 
relationships are hard to break; removing inherited bad loans from banks is less important 
than freeing banks from inherited bad clients. Czech voucher privatization strengthened 
the ties between weak enterprises and their banks; in contrast, although the Hungarian 
program involved multiple recapitalizations of banks, it addressed the issue of bad 
relationships.  As a result, the Czech Republic took over a decade to deal with soft 
lending whereas Hungary moved relatively quickly to change the incentive structure in 
banks by selling banks to foreign owners. Thus, the final cost of bank resolution in the 
Czech Republic was more than double that in Hungary.  
 
Second, the method chosen to deal with bad loan problems can reinforce the bad 
relationships that are responsible for insolvency problems.  Bank involvement with 
workouts is likely to perpetuate the relationship to the bad customer, as the Polish 
experience indicates.  However, establishing a hospital bank or an asset management 
company to workout the bad loans creates a moral hazard dilemma because of the 
expectation of further government- financed purchases of bad loans. The Czech Republic 
fell victim to this trap and China appears to be doing the same because the asset 
management companies are associated with a particular bank. Therefore, neither a 
centralized hospital bank solution nor a decentralized program leaving responsibility for 
bad loan workout with the banks is a panacea.   
 
 Third, repeated recapitalizations strengthened direct ties between the government 
and banks making a credible commitment to arms-length regulation difficult.  Hungary 
used the sale of the banks to foreign investors to remove the government from bank-client 
relationship. The establishment of a currency board in Bulgaria provided a credible legal 
constraint on bailout activity that was strengthened by subsequent rapid sales of the banks 
to foreigners. Continued state-ownership of banks invites ongoing government 
intervention and impairs the ability of regulators to act independently. The conflict of 
interest faced by the Russian central bank as both regulator and owner of Sberbank and 
government ownership of the four large Chinese banks are prime examples. Continued 
state-ownership of the savings banks in Romania and Poland, an agricultural bank in 
Poland, and the largest commercial bank in Romania also permit these governments to 
pursue industrial policy through banks to the detriment of effective regulation.   
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 Fourth, institutions matter but formal legislation is less important than the ability 
to implement vigorously equitable and transparent supervision.  The absence of 
prudential institutions or the lack of skills among regulators impeded crisis resolution in 
the Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia.  Finally, resolving bank crisis in transition countries 
is only weakly related to macroeconomic performance.  In the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Russia, and Poland, economic growth resumed before bank insolvencies were fully 
resolved.  In addition, China has an exemplary record of high growth and low inflation.  
On the other hand, in recent years, Hungary has grown faster than the Czech Republic 
and Poland while Bulgaria has grown slightly faster than Romania. Hence, experiences in 
the transition countries lend weak support to the thesis that the failure to address financial 
fragility is a deterrent to sustainable economic growth.    
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table 1: Real GDP Growth Rates 
 
 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Russia China 
1990 n.a. n.a. -3.5 -11.6 -5.6 n.a. 3.8 
1991 n.a. -11.5 -11.9 -7.0 -12.9 -5.0 9.2 
1992 n.a. -3.3 -3.1 2.6 -8.8 -14.5 14.2 
1993 -1.5 0.6 -0.6 3.8 1.5 -8.7 13.5 
1994 1.8 3.6 2.9 5.2 3.9 -12.7 12.6 
1995 2.9 5.9 1.5 7.0 7.1 -4.1 10.5 
1996 -9.4 4.3 1.3 6.0 3.9 -3.6 9.6 
1997 -5.6 -0.8 4.6 6.8 -6.1 1.4 8.8 
1998 4.0 -1.0 4.9 4.8 -4.8 -5.3 7.8 
1999 2.3 0.5 4.2 4.1 -1.2 6.3 7.1 
2000 5.4 3.3 5.2 4.0 2.1 10.0 8.0 
2001 4.1 3.1 3.8 1.0 5.7 5.1 7.5 
2002 4.9 2.0 3.5 1.4 5.0 4.7 8.0 
2003 4.3 2.9 2.9 3.8 4.9 7.3 9.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Inflation Rates 
 
Annual average % change in Consumer Prices  
 
 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Russia China 
1990 n.a. n.a. 28.9 600.0 n.a. n.a. 18.8 
1991 419.2 n.a. 34.2 76.6 133.3 n.a. 3.6 
1992 91.3 11.1 23.0 45.3 225.0 n.a. 6.3 
1993 72.8 20.8 22.4 36.9 250.5 890.0 14.6 
1994 96.0 9.9 18.8 33.2 137.9 307.6 24.2 
1995 62.1 9.2 28.3 28.0 32.1 197.4 17.1 
1996 121.6 8.8 23.4 19.8 39.0 47.7 8.3 
1997 1058.4 8.4 18.3 15.1 154.7 14.8 2.8 
1998 18.7 10.6 14.2 11.7 59.2 27.7 -0.8 
1999 2.6 2.1 10.0 7.3 45.8 85.7 -1.5 
2000 10.3 3.9 9.8 10.1 45.6 20.8 0.4 
2001 7.4 4.7 9.2 5.5 34.5 21.5 0.7 
2002 5.8 1.8 5.3 1.9 22.5 15.8 -0.8 
2003 2.3 0.1 4.7 0.7 15.3 13.7 1.2 
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Table 3: M2/GDP 
 
 
 Bulgaria China Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Russia 
1990 n.a. 0.18 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 0.10 0.19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1992 0.14 0.20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1993 0.16 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.03 0.04 
1994 0.14 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.04 
1995 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.07 
1996 0.06 0.26 0.32 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.08 
1997 0.08 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.09 
1998 0.09 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.04 
1999 0.08 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.04 
2000 0.09 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.06 
2001 0.10 0.34 0.30 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.07 
2002 0.13 0.37 0.37 0.26 0.21 0.08 0.08 
2003 0.18 0.40 0.44 0.30 0.22 0.09 0.11 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)  
 
 
  Bulgaria China 
Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Romania Russia 
1990 .. 90.0 .. 105.5 19.5 79.7 .. 
1991 118.5 92.6 .. 101.4 34.8 62.4 .. 
1992 120.7 92.0 .. 96.2 38.2 31.7 .. 
1993 133.1 103.2 74.3 97.0 40.6 21.2 25.9 
1994 103.5 92.2 75.9 93.1 36.7 18.5 31.7 
1995 68.8 91.2 75.9 82.3 32.0 23.6 25.5 
1996 108.7 97.8 72.2 72.1 33.2 28.9 27.8 
1997 20.8 106.8 72.3 66.2 34.1 18.7 29.5 
1998 15.6 121.9 64.2 62.9 35.1 21.7 44.9 
1999 15.3 130.4 59.7 52.7 37.6 17.9 33.3 
2000 17.8 132.7 54.5 54.7 34.1 14.0 24.7 
2001 20.2 138.6 49.4 50.1 36.2 12.2 25.3 
2002 23.7 166.4 45.8 53.0 36.2 13.2 26.6 
2003 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
 
 
Sources:  
 
Tables 1-3: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
Table 4: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)  
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1 Although Russia experiences an episode of negative real growth and high inflation in 
1998, the main cause of this retrenchment is the financial crisis. 
2 All the transition countries have much less developed financial systems than other 
countries at the same level of economic development (Fries and Taci, 2001). 
3 This was the situation in many of the least developed TEs, which is one reason that we 
do not examine bank restructuring in countries like Armenia or Kyrgyzstan
4 Zoli’s estimate appears to ignore the continued and ongoing fiscal support for the state-
owned savings bank and agricultural bank.   
5 Abel (2002) provide more information on Hungarian banking. 
6 All the figures here are present values in 1998 as a percent of 1998 GDP, as calculated 
by Tang, et. al. (2000).  
7 Of course, a country must have a significant banking sector to incur large restructuring 
costs.  If fiscal transfers financed by monetary expansion are used to support loss-making 
enterprises, as in Ukraine, explicit bank restructuring costs may not be incurred.  
However, the economy still suffers efficiency losses and costs from macroeconomic 
instability.   
8 With the exception of Sberbank, the former state-owned banks went through a 
metamorphosis during privatization as branches became independent entities and then 
regrouped into larger banks.   
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